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The Bellows of Dying Elephants:' Gay-,
Lesbian-, and Bisexual-Protective Hate
Crime Statutes after
R.V. v. City of St. Paul
Aklilu Dunlap*
"[T]here is inherent worth in each human being, and each is
entitled to a life of dignity."2
Introduction
An upsurge in hate crimes 3 characterized the 1980s and
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love and support.
Aklilu also wishes to thank Professor Mary Louise Fellows for her insightful
comments during the production of this article. Finally, the author acknowledges
the brave work of Professors Fellows and Beverly Balos and those others who
fiercely continue to combat the inequalities afflicting the law.
1. This phrase is borrowed from Peter Gomes, Harvard University's Memorial
Church Minister, who in explaining that the gay backlash is affirmation of the new
power of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people and a "last hurrah for the kind of blatant
gay-bashing" that was on display at the 1992 National Republican Convention, said,
"Gay bashing is the bellows of dying elephants." Bill Turque et. al., Gays Under
Fire, NEwswEEK, Sep. 14, 1992, at 34, 39.
2. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2320, 2381 (1989).
3. For purposes of this discussion, the author uses the term "hate crimes" inter-
changeably with hate-motivated violence, hate violence, bias-related violence, bias
crime, ethnoviolence and violence motivated by prejudice or bigotry. Virginia Nia
Lee, Legislative Responses to Hate-Motivated Violence: The Massachusetts Experi-
ence and Beyond, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 287, 288 (1990). The author also uses
the foregoing term as defined by the California's Attorney General Commission,
namely:
an act of intimidation, harassment physical force or threat of physical
force directed against any person, or family, or their property or advo-
cate, motivated either in whole or in part by hostility to their real or
perceived race, ethnic background, national origin, religious belief, sex,
age, disability, or sexual orientation, with the intention of causing fear
or intimidation, or to deter the free exercise or enjoyment of any rights
or privileges secured by the constitution or the laws of the United
States or (the state in which the victim is located during the time of the
offense] whether or not performed under color of law.
Id. (quoting Cal. Att'y Gen.'s Comm'n on Racial, Ethnic, Religious and Minority Vio-
lence, Cal. Dept. of Justice, Final Report 4 (1986).)
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have thus far characterized the 1990s. Hate crimes are acts rang-
ing from hate speech 4 to murder that are perpetrated on the basis
of race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or sexual orientation.5 This problem
is so widespread that the federal government enacted the Hate
Crime Statistics Act of 1990 to compel law enforcement bodies to
maintain records of hate crimes.6 Nationwide, lesbian, gay, and bi-
sexual people top the list of victims of hate-motivated crimes; they
are more frequently attacked as a single group than any other mi-
nority.7 Despite this staggering statistic, lawmakers are reluctant
The author does not recommend a presumption of bias where the victim of a
crime belongs to a minority group or is a woman. Such a presumption would likely
create an even more divisive situation in relation to the problem of diversity and
tolerance. The author reiterates that the motive behind the crime determines
whether the crime is indeed a hate crime. Finally, the author urges caution in the
implementation of such laws so as not to re-victimize the victim. In other words,
officials ought not compel victims to "prove that they did not distort the circum-
stances, misunderstand the intent [of the crime], or even enjoy it." Patricia Wil-
liams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's
Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 127, 130 (1987).
4. Hate speech is any speech having the effect of "impugning others on the basis
of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or religion, and ... speech depicting
rape or other crimes of sexual violence." Rodney A. Smolla, Introduction: Exercises
in the Regulation of Hate Speech, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 207, 207 (1991).
5. The author recognizes the pervasiveness of bias-motivated violence waged
against women on a daily basis. Unfortunately, just as the majority of hate crime
statutes that this paper will discuss omit gay, lesbian, and bisexual people from
their protective ambit, they also frequently fail to include women. Further, the au-
thor borrows the concept that subordinating violence exists in a continuum (e.g.,
verbal harassment to murder). Christine Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal
Theory, 48 U. Prrr. L. Rev. 1043, 1059 (1987).
6. Pus. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990). For the first time in the history of
the United States, federal civil rights legislation includes within its scope of study
.sexual orientation." See id. The Act orders a federal study of hate crimes, including
within its scope anti-gay attacks. Id. This marks the first time that a federal piece
of legislation recognized violence against gay, lesbian, and bisexual people as hate
crimes. Id.
Despite its recognition of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people as an at-risk group,
the Act was not without its intrinsic elements of anti-gay sentiment. The anti-gay
tone is especially evident in the comment following on the Act: "Congress finds that
the American family life is the foundation of American society... Section 2(b) makes
clear that nothing in the Act shall be construed to promote or encourage homosexu-
ality. Moreover, no funds appropriated to carry out the Act shall be used for such
purposes." Id. See also Joseph M. Fernandez, Recent Development, Bringing Hate
Crime Into Focus- The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
261, 268-69 (1991). Yet, critics of the Act maintain that it fails to deter hate crimes,
attributing its ineffectiveness to the lack of similar hate crime statutes on the state
level. Jeff Peters, When Fear Turns to Hate and Hate to Violence, 18 HuMAN RIGHTS
22, Spring 1991, at 22.
7. See Jean Latz Griffin, For '91, Chicago Lists 79 Anti-gay Assaults, CHI. Thi.,
Mar. 20, 1992, at C3; see also Hate Crimes Hit Record High, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23,
1993 at B1. By this statement, the author, by no means, intends to infer that vio-
lence against a gay man is more severe than violence against, say, a Jewish woman.
He recognizes equally the tragedy and harm of violence against any oppressed
group. Rather, the author intends to dispel an all-too-common sentiment that vio-
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to explicitly prohibit bias crimes against gay, lesbian and bisexual
people in hate crime statutes.8
In June 1992, the United States Supreme Court reviewed St.
Paul's hate crimes ordinance in RA.V. v. City of St. Paul.9 The or-
dinance criminalized adverse conduct perpetrated on the basis of
the victim's race, ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation. The
Court held the ordinance unconstitutional and established a prece-
dent that will lead to reexamination of hate crime statutes nation-
wide. This precedent will influence future hate crime legislation by
eliminating or reducing the breadth of laws protecting lesbian, gay,
and bisexual people.
This comment examines the adverse impact of the RA. V. deci-
sion on gay, lesbian, and bisexual people and recommends that
lawmakers and policymakers concern themselves with the safety of
this minority group. Part I describes the intolerance and violence
afflicting the gay community and the public opposition to protective
hate crime legislation. Part II details the Supreme Court's holdings
and rationales in RA.V. Part III criticizes the Supreme Court ma-
jority's analysis which abandons the Court's traditional categorical
approach to speech. This section explains how the Court's depar-
ture from precedent will harm gay people and asserts their need for
protective hate crime legislation. Part IV examines the option of
enacting hate crime protective measures as "penalty enhancement"
statutes outside the ambit of R.A.V.
lence against gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons is justifiable because these victims
are an expendable and disposable lot in society. The author hopes to convey the idea
that the forces that perpetrate violence against women, African-Americans, Jews,
Native-Americans, Hispanics, Asian-Americans, and other minority groups, are the
same forces that perpetrate violence against gay, lesbian, and bisexual people. See
also Littleton, supra note 5, at 1044. Finally, the author builds on the Matsuda
concept that systems of subordination operate in "the hands of different dominant-
group members." Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2334.
Lower- and middle-class whites might use violence against people of
color, while upper-class whites might resort to private clubs or right-
eous indignation against "diversity" and "reverse discrimination." In-
stitutions - government bodies, schools, corporations - also perpetuate
racism through a variety of overt and covert means.... Gutter racism,
parlor racism, corporate racism, and government racism work in coordi-
nation, reinforcing existing conditions of domination.
Id. at 2334-35.
8. Peter M. Cicchino, Comment, Sex, Lies and Civil Rights: A Critical History of
the Massachusetts Gay Civil Rights Bill, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 549, 555 (1991).
9. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (reviewing the indictment of a white juvenile for burn-
ing a cross on the lawn of an African-American family in a predominantly white
neighborhood). For a general analysis and defense of the decision in R.A.V., see




Part I - Legal & Social Status of Gay People
Lesbian women and gay men comprise ten percent of the
United States population.' 0 They have experienced historical dis-
crimination like racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. Unlike
other minorities, however, lesbian, gay, and bisexual people have
no federal civil rights protection." Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1965 does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation.12 Further, courts have held that sexual preference is not
a suspect or quasi-suspect class.13
Similarly, lesbian, gay, and bisexual Americans do not gener-
ally enjoy a greater level of protection at the state level. Few states
provide protection for lesbian, gay, and bisexual people.'4 More-
over, these state laws have a limited and narrow scope.15 To com-
pensate for the failure of state and federal government to
adequately address hate crimes against lesbian, gay, and bisexual
people, numerous municipalities have enacted ordinances protect-
ing gay people against hate crimes.1 6
As the visibility of gay people in the United States increases,17
so do the number of crimes waged against them. It is not safe to be
openly gay in the United States. Gay bashing has escalated, in part
due to the national shift to the political right.18 In recent years, the
10. See Nontraditional Affluent Customers, Am. DEMOGRAPHICS, Nov. 1992, at 10
(citing 1948 Kinsey study); but c.f. Sally Jacobs, Dispute Over Numbers Puts No
Damper on Gay Activism, BOSTON GLOBE, May 21, 1993, at 1 (disputing the ten per-
cent figure). By offering this Kinsey statistic, the author quantifies lesbian, gay, and
bisexual presence in society only as a point of fact.
11. See Fernandez, supra note 6, at 264.
12. See generally I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sexual Orientation And Title VII, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 1158 (1991).
13. See Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as
A Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1285 (1985).
14. See generally Fernandez, supra note 6, at 266-67.
15. Id.
16. Thomas H. Moore, Note, R-.AV. v. City of St. Paul: A Curious Way to Protect
Free Speech, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1252, 1252-53 (1993).
17. In the United States there are 75 openly gay elected officials, including Con-
gresspersons, judges, mayors, and city councilors. David Tuller, Gays Win Some,
Lose Some, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 5, 1992, at A12. Throughout the country, there are
approximately 1,600 gay organizations, including political, social, activist and stu-
dent groups. Bob Cohn, Discrimination: The Limits of The Law, NEWSWEEK, Sept.
14, 1992, at 38, 39.
18. This political shift has influenced legal ideology and, subsequently, gay
rights. The Eighties marked a shift in the federal judiciary, primarily the U.S.
Supreme Court, away from progressive intervention on behalf of civil rights plain-
tiffs. The rightward shift of the High Court, and its attendant hostility toward civil
rights complainants, impacts gay plaintiffs. Cicchino, supra note 8, at 550.
The federal judiciary, under the Reagan and Bush administrations, has exhib-
ited narrow interpretations of constitutional and statutory laws relating to civil
rights plaintiffs, and has sought to re-examine established doctrine in the area of
[Vol. 12:205
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number of hate crimes perpetrated against gays, "one of the most
despised and persecuted minority groups,"1 9 rose by 31 percent.20
In 1989, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force reported 7,031
incidents of anti-gay violence. 2 1
Gay rights advocates 2 2 acknowledge that although increasing
social acceptance may have facilitated victims' reporting of gay
bashing and may help explain the escalating statistics,23 nothing
accounts for the increasing severity of the violence.24 "Drive-by
slurs and egg-tossing have given way with more frequency to nail-
studded baseball bats and switchblades."25 One such violent inci-
dent occurred on October 27, 1989 in Los Angeles when a sheriffs
department patrol car pulled over two gay men driving home from a
Halloween party.26 The police yanked one of the men out of the car,
called him anti-gay epithets, knocked him down, handcuffed him,
beat him with a nightstick, and repeatedly kicked him in the side,
causing broken bones and nerve damage. 27 In another incident,
pipe-wielding skinheads yelling "Kill the faggot" beat a gay man
into unconsciousness in Laguna Beach, California. 28 Outside a gay
civil rights and civil liberties. Id. at 552. This means limited civil rights protection
for all, and gay people have had little civil rights protection to begin with. Id. Not
only has this narrowed existing rights, but it eliminated the chance of expanding the
recognition of rights, particularly for gay plaintiffs. Id.
19. Id. at 548. A survey tabulated in 1987 by the U.S. Department of Justice
concluded that gay, lesbian, and bisexual people were probably the most frequent
victims of hate crimes. Id. A 1985 public opinion survey revealed that 73% of the
respondents thought sexual relations between two adults of the same sex was al-
ways wrong. Id. Attitudes such as these "contribute to the commission of violence
against gay people." Id. In 1989, a survey indicated that seven percent of the gay
community reported being physically assaulted in the last twelve months as a result
of violence targeting gay, lesbian, and bisexual people. Id.
20. Turque, supra note 1, at 36.
21. Fernandez, supra note 6, at 261.
22. For the purpose of brevity, the author reluctantly uses the phrase "gay
rights' to mean the rights of lesbian, gay, and bisexual people.
23. Turque, supra note 1, at 36. Despite an increase in the number of reports,
task force officials maintain that 75-80 percent of gay crime victims never file a po-
lice report. Julie Nichols, YLD Studies Anti-Gay Violence, 14 BAMuRTR, Summer
1987, at 19. Officials attribute this to the homophobia that is rampant within police
departments, which leads to "police abuse, unequal enforcement of laws, or deliber-
ate mishandling of cases." Id. What is more, police discourage gay, lesbian, and bi-
sexual people from reporting incidents of violence, reasoning that both reporting and
investigating is not worth while. Id.
24. See Nadie Broohan, Rise in Anti-Gay Crimes Is Reported in New York, N.Y.
TudEs, Mar. 7, 1991, at B3.
25. Turque, supra note 1, at 36.




bar in Burlington, Vermont, a gay man was beaten until he suffered
numerous skull fractures and brain damage.29
Although no federal criminal statute protects the rights of les-
bian, gay, and bisexual people in the United States, the federal gov-
ernment, in an unprecedented move, included gay men and women
in the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990.30 The Act requires the
Department of Justice to collect data on the incidence of hate
crimes in the United States. The purposes of the Act are to (1) com-
pile the empirical data necessary to develop effective policies to
fight the problem of hate-motivated violence; (2) raise public aware-
ness; and (3) provoke an official response. 3l
During the 1980s states began to enact legislation criminaliz-
ing bias violence. These statutes typically criminalize intimidation
and harassment based on prejudice, prohibit acts that are already
criminal offenses when those acts are motivated by bias, impose
heightened penalties for criminal conduct motivated by bias, and
criminally proscribe interference with a person's civil rights.32 By
the decade's end, nearly every state enacted laws providing en-
hanced penalties for the bias-motivated crimes of racists and
bigots.33
Incidents in Colorado, the only state that prohibits gay-protec-
tive laws, are representative of the increasing frequency and sever-
ity of violence against gay people. Three gay men were murdered in
separate incidents.34 In one incident, assailants shouted anti-gay
slurs and fatally shot a heterosexual man at a convenience store
because they believed he was gay.35 His pregnant wife waited for
him in their parked car as he was being shot.36 In another incident,
29. Yvonne Daley, Beating of Gay Man Raises Stakes for Vermont Hate Crimes
Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 22, 1990, at 73.
30. PuB. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140(1990). For a description of the Act and
some of its latent anti-gay biases, see supra note 6.
31. Pub. L. No. 101-275.
32. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
33. James H. Rubin, Court Says States and Cities May Not Outlaw 'Hate
Crimes,' Cm. DAILY L. BuL., June 22, 1992, at Al. Utah, Wyoming, Nebraska, and
Alaska are the only states that do not provide some form of hate crime law in the
country. Id. The author distinguishes hate crime statutes from enhancement stat-
utes. Whereas the former criminalizes adverse conduct perpetrated because of the
victim's sex or minority status, the latter enhances existing criminal behavior that is
perpetrated on the foregoing basis.
34. Dirk Johnson, Colorado Homosexuals Feel Betrayed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
1992, at A38.
35. Id.
36. Id. This case illustrates that no one is shielded from homophobia, even those
who do not identify themselves as gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Further, even though
the victim in this case was a heterosexual, his victimization continues to terrorize
and intimidate persons outside the majority. The author includes this case to point
out the tragic irony in the dynamics of hate and violence and to also illustrate the
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gay bashers struck a gay man twice in the face as he was leaving a
bar.3 7 They knocked him to the pavement, causing his skull to hit
the concrete so hard that people across the street heard the im-
pact.38 He died two days later.3 9 Gay bashing is not limited in va-
riety nor restricted to isolated incidents.40
The statistics only reflect the physical injuries and property
damage hate crime violence causes its victims, not the psychological
harm. "Violence motivated by prejudice leaves behind acute emo-
tional and psychological scars on the victim and on the victim's
community."41 "Victims of vicious hate propaganda have exper-
ienced ... nightmares, post-traumatic stress disorder, hyperten-
sion, psychosis, and suicide."4 2 Rates of alcoholism and substance
abuse are high among gay people43 and suicide is the leading cause
of death among gay teenagers. 44 "The negative effects of hate
messages are real and immediate for the victims."4 5 Further, hate
speech restricts its victims' personal freedom by forcing them to
"quit jobs, forego education, leave their homes, avoid certain public
places, curtail their own exercise of speech rights, and otherwise
modify their behavior and demeanor."'46 Hate speech forces its
targets to destroy their sense of self in order to cope with its psycho-
logical violence.47 In short, hate speech is the tool of "spirit mur-
der."'48 These disturbing facts do not even begin to measure the
fear and loss of productivity that result from gay oppression.
Despite the compelling evidence that hate speech dispropor-
tionately and severely harms gay people, the public greatly resists
extending them any explicit protection. For example, Gainesville,
Florida adopted a resolution on June 2, 1992, urging the Alachua
County Commission to exclude a homosexual rights amendment
from its proposed anti-discrimination ordinance.49 Commissioner
point that persons outside the target groups of hate crimes are equally susceptible to
violence and harm.




41. Fernandez, supra note 6, at 262.
42. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2336.
43. Kay Long Cope, Gay Teenagers Come Out and Find Support, BosToN GLOBE,
Aug. 22, 1990, at 47.
44. Protect the Rights of Gays Against Discrimination, U.S.A. TODAY, June 2,
1992, at 10A.
45. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2336.
46. Id. at 2337.
47. Williams, supra note 3, at 129-30.
48. See id.
49. Matthew Sauer, Gainesville Resolution Condemns Gay Rights, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMEs, June 3, 1992, at 5B.
21119931
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Courtland Collier, sponsor of the proposition, reasoned that the
"special protection" was unnecessary because "we all have equal
protection now."50 Further, the resolution suggested that ex-
tending legal protection to gay and bisexual people would lead to
protecting "other sexual interests such as pedophilia, bestiality and
necrophilia.'"51
Preying on the public's fear and hatred of lesbian, gay, and
bisexual people, the religious right and other conservatives, led by
Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, Billy Graham, Lou Sheldon, Pat
Buchanan, and Dan Quayle, have equated homosexuality with mor-
ally depraved acts such as child molestation.5 2 In their city halls,
school boards, and state legislatures, the religious right has waged
a well-organized counter-offensive to the gay rights movement's
progress.5 3 It hopes to push back the gay community's advance into
mainstream society.5 4 Proponents of gay rights maintain that the
movement for gay equality is "a battle about specific issues, such as
whether homosexuals have a right to equal job opportunities or to
serve in the military."55 They point out that gay rights do not ex-
tend special rights to lesbian, gay, and bisexual people, but only
guarantee them the basic human rights the majority enjoys. 5 6
Groups like the Christian Action Network, (CAN), disagree. In its
fundraising efforts, CAN ran thirty-second television advertise-
ments showing clips of gay political activists hugging and wearing
black leather attire.5 7 The voice over this propaganda advertise-
ment inaccurately stated that "Bill Clinton's vision for a better
America includes job quotas for homosexuals. Is this your vision for
a better America?"5 8
During the 1992 elections, the religious right generated a
number of anti-gay proposals. 5 9 The most far-reaching proposal
was Oregon's Measure 9. Approximately 140,000 Oregonians
signed a petition to include an amendment designed to exclude the
words "sexual orientation" from the state's hate crime statute as
50. Matthew Sauer, Crowd Agrees with Gay Rights Opposition, ST. PETERSBURG
Tms, June 5, 1992, at 5B.
51. Id.




55. Jeffrey Schmalz, Gay Politics Goes Mainstream, N.Y. TesS, Oct. 11, 1992, at
§ 18.
56. Cohn, supra note 17, at 39.
57. Andrea Stone, Millions of Gays Mobilizing for Vote 'Of Our Lives,' U.S.A.
TODAY, Oct. 29, 1992, at 5A.
58. Id.
59. See generally Turque, supra note 1.
[Vol. 12:205
BELLOWS OF DYING ELEPHANTS
well as from any other legislation in which it appeared.60 Although
the measure failed 57% to 43%,61 it succeeded in providing a na-
tional forum to anti-gay sentiment.6 2 In Oregon's Measure 9, reli-
gious conservatives went to the extreme of asking state voters to
classify homosexuality as "abnormal, wrong, unnatural and per-
verse," and to preclude the state legislature from enacting laws pro-
tecting citizens on the basis of sexual orientation. 63 The Oregon
Citizens Alliance, (OCA), the main force behind Measure 9, sug-
gested that it could "cure" lesbian, gay, and bisexual people, re-
jecting new scientific evidence which suggests homosexuality has
genetic origins.64 Had Measure 9 succeeded, it would have banned
the extension of civil rights protection to homosexuals and required
government branches and public schools to actively discourage
homosexuality.
Gay organizations and individuals [could have been denied] use
of public facilities such as parks and meeting rooms, state pub-
lic broadcasting outlets [would have had] to ban pro-gay pro-
gramming, state licensing boards [could have refused] those
deemed "perverse," libraries [would have had] to remove books
with any positive references to homosexuality, school textbooks
[would have been "cleansed"], AIDS treatment centers [could
have been closed], and individual employers and landlords
could [have kicked] out 'abnormal' employees and tenants. 65
Although Oregon's extreme measure failed, Colorado's similar
proposal, Amendment 2, passed. Amendment 2 prohibits any mu-
nicipality from protecting gay people against discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. 66 As a result, Colorado is the only state
in the country to grant the right to discriminate on the basis of sex-
ual orientation.6 7 This law effectively voids the existing ordinances
in Denver, Aspen, and Boulder that protected lesbian, gay, and bi-
sexual people from discrimination. 68 Although Colorado's Amend-
ment 2 is not as explicitly anti-gay as Oregon's Measure 9, the net
result is the same: it undermines existing gay rights. Amendment
60. Oregon; Perversity, Adversity, THE EcoNoMIST, Oct. 10, 1992, at 31.
61. Oregon Referendum Leaves Bitterness, PLAMn DEALER, Nov. 7, 1992, at 5A.
62. Bettina Boxall, Election Gives Gays Victories, New Battles, L.A. TimEs, Nov.
5, 1992, at A29.
63. See Turque, supra note 1, at 37.
64. Id.
65. Cooper, supra note 51, at 29.
66. Ancel Martinez, Gay Groups Urge Colorado Boycott Over Discrimination
Law, REUTERs, Nov. 6, 1992 (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File).
"Tuesday's vote made Colorado the only state in the U.S. with a constitutional provi-
sion outlawing rules or laws at the state and local level that protect homosexuals
from discrimination." James Coates, Gays Consider Colorado Boycott, Cm. Tam.,
Nov. 7, 1992, at C1.




2's opponents have challenged the new law on the constitutional
grounds that a municipal ordinance cannot be overturned by consti-
tutional amendment and on its violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.6 9
The recent wave of anti-gay initiatives and their associated
propaganda unleashed an escalating volume of violence. Since the
introduction of Measure 9, gay bashing incidents in Oregon have
increased by 300 percent.7 0 A recent double murder in Oregon il-
lustrates this statistic. Before Oregon's proposed Measure 9 was
even scheduled for voting, an African-American lesbian and a white
gay man burned to death in Salem when skinheads shouting "Nig-
ger dyke" and "Faggot" threw a homemade bomb into their home,
setting it ablaze. 7 1 Two weeks prior to that night, skinheads had
beaten the male victim, Brian Mock, so severely that his friends
could not recognize him. 72 In fact, one of the reasons he lived with
Hattie Mae Cohens, the female victim, reportedly a physically pow-
erful woman, was to protect himself.73 These murders demonstrate
the effect of the negative propaganda surrounding a proposal such
as Measure 9, as well as the collaboration of racism with
homophobia in hate crimes. 74 One Measure 9 supporter said, "You
know if you give them special status, then they got job quotas. My
husband already has to face that on the job with minorities."75
Fearing the loss of their citizenship, a number of gay Oregonians
remarked that these incidents reflect their precarious position in
society and the depth of homophobia.7 6 However, according to some
gay rights proponents, this backlash affirms gay people's new
power and is a last hurrah for the blatant gay-bashing displayed at
the 1992 Republican Convention in Houston, Texas.7 7
Part II - R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
Seventeen year-old Robert Viktoria and his two friends were
wide awake in the pre-dawn hours of June 21, 1990.78 Scuttling
about in a working class neighborhood in St. Paul, the youths as-
sembled a cross from pieces of a chair, wrapped it in a terry cloth
69. Johnson, supra note 34; Boxall, supra note 62; Martinez, supra note 66.




74. See supra note 2 and accompanying discussion of interlocking systems of
subordination.
75. Cooper, supra note 51, at 29.
716. Id. at 34-35.
77. Id. at 35-37.
78. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2541 (1992).
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doused with paint thinner and placed it within the fenced yard of
an African-American family that had recently moved into the all
white neighborhood. 79 Viktoria lived just across the street from the
victims' home.80 The City of St. Paul charged the juvenile Viktoria
with violating the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance. The
ordinance made it a misdemeanor offense to place a burning cross,
Nazi swastika, or similar symbol on public or private property.8 1
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Supreme Court pitted two
well-entrenched lines of precedent: the protection of even offensive
speech versus the status of "fighting words."82 Under the fighting
words doctrine, the state can criminalize the utterance of fighting
words in a face-to-face confrontation when the language creates a
clear and present danger of physical violence.83 Proponents of hate
crime legislation maintain that the fighting words doctrine justifies
hate crime statutes. 84 Hate crime statutes are generally worded to
prohibit particular communications in order to protect the dignity
of individuals or shield them from attacks based on their race,
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or religion.85
The controversy over the St. Paul ordinance concerned the fol-
lowing phrase: "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others."8 6
While the Minnesota Supreme Court limited its construction of the
ordinance to those symbols or displays that amount to "fighting
words,"87 the U.S. Supreme Court maintained that the ordinance
79. Georgia Sargeant, High Court Strikes Ban on Hate Speech, TRiAL, Aug. 1992,
at 16.
80. R.AV., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
81. Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, ST. PAUL, MiNN., LEGIs. CODE § 292.02
(1990). Specifically, it provides:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appella-
tion, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning
cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to
know arouse anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religious or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.
St. Paul could have pursued conviction based on other charges (e.g., terrorist
threats and damage of private property). RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541. In fact, the city
also charged Viktoria with assault for causing fear of immediate bodily harm or
death. Rubin, supra note 33.
82. See generally RJAV., 112 S. Ct. at 2538.
83. See id.
84. Smolla, supra note 4, at 208.
85. Id.
86. Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, ST. PAUL, MiNN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02
(1990).
87. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991) (upholding the St.
Paul ordinance). The U.S. Supreme Court was bound by the Minnesota Supreme
Court's construction of St. Paul's Bias-Motivated disorderly conduct ordinance, and
therefore accepted the state court's authoritative statement that the ordinance only
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applied only to "fighting words" that insult, or provoke violence, on
grounds of race, color, creed, religion or gender."
The Supreme Court with Justice Antonin Scalia writing the
majority opinion ignored Petitioner's request to modify the
Chaplinsky88 formulation of the "fighting words" doctrineS9 and in-
validated the ordinance for overbreadth. The Scalia majority held
that the ordinance "prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on
the basis of the subjects the speech addresses."90 Generally, the
Court stated, the First Amendment bars the government from pro-
scribing speech or expressive conduct on the basis of its disapproval
of the ideas expressed.91 The Court however reiterated that states
may restrict the content of limited types of speech which have "such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality."92
Justice Scalia wrote that although the Court has previously
ruled that obscenity, fighting words, and defamation "are not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech," cases involv-
ing restrictions on these types of speech should be examined on a
case-by-case basis.93 Explaining the Court's traditional treatment
of this disfavored category of speech, Justice Scalia wrote:
What they mean is that these areas of speech can, consistently
with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their con-
stitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)
- not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the
Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content
discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable
content.9 4
Further, Justice Scalia declared that the government may not regu-
late this disfavored speech based on hostility toward, or approval of,
reached expressions constituting "fighting words." RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542. Jus-
tice Scalia in the majority opinion states that "[iut is not true that 'fighting words'
have at most a 'de minimis' expressive content, ibid, or that their content is in all
respects 'worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection' sometimes they are
quite expressive indeed." Id. at 2542-43.
88. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
89. Id.
90. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542 (citing Broderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610
(1973)). In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court held that government
could criminalize "insulting or 'fighting words,'" which it defined as "those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace."
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
91. RA V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-
311 (1940) (proscribing speech), and Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (ex-
pressive conduct)).
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non-proscribable messages that they contain. 95 "Thus, the govern-
ment may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content
discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the
government."96
The Court explained excluding "fighting words" from First
Amendment protection as follows: "[It] simply means that, for pur-
poses of that Amendment, the unprotected features of the words
are, despite their verbal character, essentially a 'nonspeech' ele-
ment of communication."97 Therefore, the government may not reg-
ulate the use of "fighting words" on the basis of its hostility toward
or approval of the underlying message expressed.98 The Court rea-
soned that the St. Paul ordinance was facially unconstitutional
under the First Amendment because it prohibited speakers from ex-
pressing disfavored views on the subjects of race, color, creed, reli-
gion or gender but permitted speech containing abusive invectives
not addressing those subjects.99 Consequently, "the ordinance
[went] beyond mere content discrimination to actual viewpoint dis-
crimination." 00 The Court stated that the City of St. Paul had no
authority to "license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while
requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules."O1
In addition to finding the ordinance facially unconstitutional,
the Court held that St. Paul's desire to communicate to the minority
groups that it did not condone the "group hatred" of bias-motivated
speech did not justify the ordinance.1O2 It rejected the city's "secon-
dary effect" claim that the ordinance was required to protect groups
who had suffered historical discrimination.103 Justice Scalia stated
that listeners' reactions to certain speech were not a "secondary ef-
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2543. The Scalia opinion further referred to New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 763 (1992), which upheld New York's child pornography law by expressly
recognizing that that case did not rise to the level of censoring a particular literary
theme.
97. R.AV., 112 S. Ct. at 2545.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2547. The Court also reasoned that although the Minnesota Supreme
Court construed the ordinance to reach only those symbols or displays that
amounted to "fighting words," the remaining terms of the ordinance strictly applied
to "fighting words" that target it explicitly protected groups. Thus, if a person
wished to use "fighting words" combined with other ideas in order to express hostil-
ity on the basis of sexual orientation, he or she would not be covered by the ordi-
nance. Consequently, "[tihe First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose
special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects."
Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2548.
102. Id. at 2549.
103. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding regula-
tions on "secondary effects" of pornography).
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fect" that the Court had in mind because the "emotive impact of
speech on its audience is not a secondary effect."' 0 4
Finally, the Court held that St. Paul's ordinance was not suffi-
ciently narrowly-tailored to serve the compelling state interest of
ensuring the basic human rights of groups which have suffered his-
torical discrimination "to live in peace where they wish."105 Stating
that the Court did not doubt the compelling nature of the ordi-
nance's purpose, Justice Scalia added that the danger associated
with censorship required the Court to invalidate such legislation
where it was not necessary to serve the asserted purpose.Os The
Court found that a regulation not limited to specific topics such as
race and gender would have the same beneficial effect, and the St.
Paul ordinance was therefore not reasonably necessary to accom-
plish the government's goals.1l7
Part III - The Impact of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
I see no First Amendment values that are compromised by a
law that prohibits hoodlums from driving minorities out of their
homes by burning crosses on their lawns, but I see great harm
in preventing the people of Saint Paul from specifically punish-
ing the race-based fighting words that so prejudice their
community.10 8
The majority's reasoning in RA. V. was flawed and will exacer-
bate confusion concerning the First Amendment and more impor-
tantly, deny at-risk groups protection from hate crimes. 10 9 Because
St. Paul's hate crime ordinance reached beyond "fighting words"
and attacked constitutionally protected speech, it went too far to
shield its protected classes. The St. Paul ordinance criminalized
any conduct that "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender."110 The R.A.V.
majority rewrote First Amendment analysis by abandoning the
Court's traditional categorical approach to analyzing restrictions on
expression. Justice Blackmun wrote that the Scalia majority set
104. RAV., 112 S. Ct. at 2549 (quoting Renton, 485 U.S. at 312).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2549-50 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (plurality)
(Slip op., at 8)); Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educator's Assn., 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983)).
107. Id. at 2550. The majority opinion stated that St. Paul's content limitation
only served to display the city council's particular hostility towards the enumerated
biases. Id.
108. Id. at 2561 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
109. The author uses the phrase "at-risk" to refer to both protected groups as well
as those not protected but equally vulnerable to the violence of hate crimes (e.g., gay,
lesbian, and bisexual people).
110. Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, ST. PAuL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02
(1990).
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both "law and logic on their heads" by deciding that Government
cannot regulate greatly harmful speech without also regulating
speech that does not cause great harm."' As a result, the R.AV.
decision will either be disregarded as an aberration or cause an
across-the-board weakening of traditional speech protections. 112
Justice Blackmun charged that the "Court manipulated doc-
trine to strike down an ordinance whose premise it opposed,
namely, that racial threats and verbal assaults are of greater harm
than other fighting words."11 In other words, the R.A.V. majority
was distracted by the temptation to strike at "politically correct
speech" and cultural diversity ideology, of which it disapproves.114
In doing so, the Court failed to apply the Constitution to accomplish
the Constitution's purpose. 115 The Scalia majority ignored the wis-
dom of First Amendment precedent and abandoned the principle of
stare decisis. Some speech is beneath the dignity of First Amend-
ment protection and the Supreme Court has traditionally accorded
differential treatment to content-based regulations of speech in the
form of child pornography, 116 obscenity, 117 and defamation."l 8
Hate speech, like other forms of hate crimes, is injurious at
varying levels. It poses intrinsic harm to individuals, identifiable
groups, and the greater society. Hate speech's intrinsic harm, a de-
ontic harm, manifests itself in the form of grievous, severe psycho-
logical injury.119  Moreover, tolerance for hate speech is
inconsistent with the principle of equality of the Fourteenth
Amendment.120
Hate speech causes the greatest injury to the groups it
targets.121 A 1989 Vanderbilt University report found that "the
health of lesbians and gay men is affected when day after day they
are forced to say the opposite of what they feel." 122 Thus, "speech
likely to cast contempt or ridicule on identifiable groups ought to be
regulated to prevent injury to the status and prospects of the mem-
111. R.AV., 112 S. Ct. at 2560.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2560-61.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2561.
116. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
117. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
118. See Beauharnaus v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
119. Robert C. Post, Free Speech and Religious, Racial and Sexual Harassment:
Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267,
272 (1991). Deontic harm means that "there is an 'elemental wrongness' to racist
expression, regardless of the presence or absence of particular empirical conse-
quences such as grievous, severe psychological injury." Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 273.
122. Peters, supra note 6, at 25, 30.
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bers of those groups." 123 If this is the case with speech aimed at a
racial group, it ought to apply to gay people as well. Homophobia
like racism is a structural subordination of a group based on the
idea that the group is inferior.124
Homophobic and other biased expressions harm individuals in
ways related to "the dignitary torts of defamation, invasion of pri-
vacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress." 25 As a re-
sult of hate crimes, gay individuals suffer feelings of humiliation,
isolation, and self hatred.126 The history and reality of gay discrim-
ination in this country magnifies these insults.127 The identity de-
velopment of individual lesbian, gay, and bisexual people is
damaged by society's anti-homosexual norms and values.12s Anti-
gay hate crimes exacerbate gay people's poor self-image.
Finally, hate speech also harms the greater society by dimin-
ishing the quality of the marketplace of ideas. The common public
perceptions that homosexuality is sinful and that lesbian, gay, and
bisexual people are easy targets fuels anti-gay violence.129 The
purpose of this violence is to isolate both the gay individual and the
gay community.' 30 Lesbian, gay, and bisexual people can contrib-
ute to the free marketplace of ideas if that marketplace does not
prey on them. Society will be the lesser without the contributions
and voices of all its constituents, including lesbian, gay, and bisex-
ual people.
Hate crime statutes are extremely important to lesbian, gay,
and bisexual people, the most frequent target of hate crimes,XSl yet
these individuals lack meaningful state or federal protection. 132
123. Id.
124. Id., (citing Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 273-274.
128. Peggy Hanley-Hackenbruck, Psychotherapy and the 'Coming Out" Process, 1
J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOrHERAPY 21, at 22 (1989). Feelings attached to this stigma-
tized identity include feelings of shame, guilt, doubt, self-loathing, confusion and
alienation. Id. at 23, 28. The various forms of oppression, such as gay-bashing, that
gay, lesbian, and bisexual people experience on a daily basis compounds the afore-
mentioned issues with both interpersonal and social systems losses. Natalie Jane
Woodman, Mental Health Issues of Relevance to Lesbian Women and Gay Men, 1 J.
GAY & LEsBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY 53, at 55 (1989). These losses include loss of self
esteem, of spiritual supports, of family members and support systems, of job and
income, and of one's lover. Id. These losses are also compounded with the rejection
gay individuals experience from their nongay peers. Id.
129. See Nichols, supra note 23, at 19.
130. Id. The AIDS epidemic has lent greater impetus to such perpetrators of hate
crimes. Id.
131. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
132. See, Part I, supra.
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Advocates of hate crime statutes maintain that the statutes are
necessary to control the upsurge of crimes motivated by a hatred for
lesbian, gay, and bisexual people; blacks; Jews; Asians; other mi-
norities; and women. 133 For gay people, hate crime statutes are es-
sential because without them, law enforcement will continue to
ignore the problem of gay bashing.13 4 When law enforcement offi-
cials fail to respond promptly and seriously to hate crimes, they lose
the trust of the gay community. The upsurge of anti-gay violence
warrants a government response beyond just tackling the problem
as mere assault or other criminal offense. The government has the
burden of protecting its minority citizens from hate-motivated vio-
lence by responding to the increase in hate crimes.
Part IV - Hate Crimes Statutes after R.A.V.
In his concurrence in the judgment, Justice Harry Blackmun
warned, "[t]he majority opinion signals one of two possibilities: it
will serve as precedent for future cases, or it will not. Either result
is disheartening."'135 Justice Blackmun's foreboding response to
the majority opinion is ringing true in the period since R.A.V., dur-
ing which a number of federal and state courts have reviewed the
constitutionality of similar statutes with mixed results.136 How-
ever, in June 1993, the Supreme Court decided Wisconsin v. Mitch-
ell,13 7 and remedied some of the confusion created by R.A.V. 138
133. Rubin, supra note 33, at 1.
134. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
135. R.A V., 112 S. Ct. at 2560. Although the judgment was unanimous, Justices
White, O'Connor, Blackmun, and Stevens did not concur in the majority's reasoning.
Justice White warned of an adverse effect of the ruling. Id. at 2550 (White, J., con-
curring). Justice White reasoned that the statute was too broad, because it outlawed
not only expression that has long been held to deserve no protection (e.g., causing a
riot) but also speech that merely causes "hurt feelings, offense or resentment." Id.
136.. Two Florida cases, in particular, illustrate both the confusion and the contra-
diction that the RA.V. decision invites in subsequent First Amendment jurispru-
dence. Reviewing a statute with the exact same text, in cases sharing comparable
facts and involving assaults provable beyond a reasonable doubt, two courts of ap-
peals applied the RA. V. test only to yield contradictory holdings. See Dobbins v.
State, 605 So.2d 922, 925 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 5th Dist. 1992) and Richards v. State.,
17 Fla. L. Weekly D2595, 1992 WL 335899 (Fla. App. 3d Dist. 1992).
The RA.V.-induced inconsistency is not restricted to the two Florida cases. Two
other courts also wrestled with the formless rationale that is the standard of R.A.V..
See, e.g., State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992) (holding that the effect of an
ethnic intimidation statute as it punished only motive is to create a "thought crime"
in violation of state and federal protection of the First Amendment rights); State v.
Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992) (holding that the state intimidation statute is not
unconstitutionally vague under either state or federal constitutional standards, nor
does it proscribe speech).
137. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
138. Whereas the St. Paul ordinance prohibited racially and otherwise discrimi-
natory conduct, the Wisconsin statute provided for enhancement of penalties for of-
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Mitchell involved a black male defendant who incited a group
of other black males to attack a white boy who was walking in their
vicinity.139 The group beat the boy into a coma that lasted four
days. 140 A circuit court convicted Mitchell of aggravated battery
and sentenced him to two years in prison, the maximum sentence
under the Wisconsin sentencing guidelines. 141 However, Wiscon-
sin's hate crime statute enhanced that sentence to four years.142
On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court
decision.143 However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the statue "'violates the First Amendment directly by
punishing what the legislature has deemed to be offensive
thought.'"144 The Court, distinguishing Mitchell from R.A.V., up-
held the Wisconsin hate crime statute with a rationale that limited
the R.A V. decision.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, contrasted
the statute in Mitchell from the one in R.A.V. '45 Whereas the St.
Paul ordinance "was explicitly directed at expression," the Wiscon-
sin statute "is aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amend-
ment."146 The Court rejected the argument that the statute
punished bigoted thought, dismissing the view that conduct can be
called "speech" whenever the actor intends it to express an idea.147
The Court stated that the First Amendement does not protect con-
duct such as physical assault.148
fenses that targeted victims on the basis of an unlawful discrimination. Mitchell,
113 S. Ct. at 2197. This is a point of fact which the U.S. Supreme Court used to
distinguish R.AV. from Mitchell, thereby justifying the different result. The Wis-
consin high court reasoned that the statute, which enhanced the potential penalty
for criminal actors if the state proved that the actor intentionally selected the victim
on the basis of the victim's race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, na-
tional origin, or ancestry, violated the First Amendment on grounds that it was
overly broad in its effort to punish offensive thought, the effect of which was to chill
free speech. Mitchell, 473 N.W.2d at 814-815. The Mitchell court reasoned that:
[t]he conduct of "selecting" is not akin to the conduct of assaulting, bur-
glarizing, murdering and other criminal conduct. It cannot be objec-
tively established. Rather, an examination of the intentional
"selection" of a victim necessarily requires a subjected examination of
the actor's motive or reason for singling out the particular person
against whom he or she commits a crime.
Id. at 813.





144. Id. (citing 485 N.W.2d 807, 811 (1992)).
145. Id. at 2201.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2199.
148. Id.
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While the Court determined that the statute punished con-
duct, it also acknowledged that the statute considered the motive of
racial bias in enhancing the penalty.149 However, it pointed out
that judges have traditionally considered motive an aggravating
factor in sentencing.150 In addition, the Court recognized that the
Wisconsin statute provided enhanced penalties only for only bias-
related crimes151 "because this conduct is thought to inflict greater
individual and societal harm."152 By quoting Blackstone, the Court
suggests that the statute's focus on bias crimes is justified because
"'it is [ ] reasonable that among crimes of different natures those
should be most severely punished, which are the most destructive
of the public safety and happiness.'" i5 3
Finally, the Court rejected the overbreadth challenge to the
statute's constitutionality. Justice Rehnquist found that the stat-
ute's potential "chilling effect on free speech" was "far more attenu-
ated and unlikely that contemplated in traditional 'overbreadth'
cases."
154
While R.A V. prohibited broadly tailored anti-bias crimes stat-
utes, Mitchell stands for the proposition that laws enhancing penal-
ties for bias-motivated crimes do not violate the First Amendment.
Mitchell serves to strengthen confidence in existing enhancement
statutes for bias-motivated crimes and should pave the way for the
enactment of such statutes in the 23 states that do not provide en-
hanced penalties for bias-motivated crimes.
Conclusion
Despite having made some significant political and social
gains, gay people remain the most frequent targets of hate crimes
or gay-bashing. Municipal and state response to the upsurge of
hate crimes has been to draft statutes proscribing conduct that
rises to the level of "fighting words" and is aimed at protected
groups, sometimes even including lesbian, gay, and bisexual people.
On this basis, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that pro-
scribed hate crimes on grounds that it was overbroad and violated
the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech. First
Amendment scholars expected the Supreme Court to use the facts
of R.A.V. to distinguish between offensive speech that incites or









that angers the audience against the speaker, which may be pro-
tected. Instead the Court held that the government cannot single
out one type of fighting words (e.g., cross-burning) on the basis of its
message. The Court reasoned that to do so would squelch unpopu-
lar ideas. In addition, the Court abandoned the categorical ap-
proach to First Amendment analysis finding that obscenity,
defamation, and "fighting words" are constitutionally-recognized
forms of speech that are subject to governmental regulation. This
created an underinclusive analysis, defying logic and the principle
of stare decisis.
The result of the R.A.V. decision will either be ignored or will
further confuse the hate crime debate. Subsequent cases visiting
the constitutionality question of hate crime statutes under First
Amendment standards indicate that R.A.V. will serve to confuse
this arena of jurisprudence. However, the Supreme Court lessened
the confusion somewhat by upholding the penalty-enhancement
statute in Mitchell. Despite R.A.V.'s bar of overbroad regulation of
hate crimes, it does not by any means preclude closely tailored stat-
utes designed to shield against hateful conduct targeted at pro-
tected groups. Lesbian, gay, and bisexual people stand to gain the
most from such a statute, because they top the list of the targets of
hate crimes. The constitutionality of a gay-protective hate crime
statute will thus likely depend on the clarity of its terms and the
narrowness of its scope of prohibited conduct.
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